

FOREIGN POLICY BULLETIN

An analysis of current international events



1918-1949

FOREIGN POLICY ASSOCIATION • INCORPORATED • 22 EAST 38TH STREET • NEW YORK 16, N. Y.

VOL. XXVIII No. 19

FEBRUARY 18, 1949

Mindszenty Trial Raises Basic Church-State Issue

WASHINGTON—The trial and sentencing of Cardinal Archbishop Mindszenty, Prince Primate of Hungary, which have profoundly shocked the West, are not a new development in history. Attempts by civil authority to subordinate the influence of the Catholic Church became common in Western nations long before Communist parties gained power in the East.

Bismarck tried to restrict Catholicism in order to destroy anti-Prussian sentiment in the provinces of Catholic Poland incorporated into Prussia. The French revolutionaries of 1789 decreed the worship of reason in place of God and drove Pope Pius VI from Rome. France manifested a strong anticlerical spirit as recently as 1905, when the French government separated Church and State and imposed the still existing prohibition against members of religious orders teaching school while dressed in their religious habit. The Mexican constitution of 1917 forbade the Church to acquire, hold or administer real property. Like the contemporary Hungarian government, English Kings Henry VIII and Edward VI and Queen Elizabeth sequestered Church lands, and it was not until 1829, by the Catholic Emancipation Act, that England permitted Catholics to sit in Parliament in modern times. Napoleon I kept Pope Pius VII a prisoner at Savona and Fontainebleau because he would not support the French in their war against England. The revolutionaries who created the united Italian nation in 1871 incorporated the Papal States of Pope Pius IX into the new kingdom, made his capital, Rome, the Italian

capital, and left him in voluntary imprisonment in the Vatican because he opposed their purpose. History is full of examples of clashes between Church and State.

Consequences of Trial

However, the fact that conflict between civil and ecclesiastical authorities is a long familiar phenomenon and not merely a peculiar fruit of communism does not lessen the importance of the trial of Cardinal Mindszenty for contemporary international relations. One result is clear. Since the Western powers have come to blame the U.S.S.R. for the actions of the Eastern European nations, the trial has strengthened the influence in Washington of those Americans, both government officials and private citizens, who reject the thesis which President Truman himself cautiously advanced in Kansas City in December that the United States and the Soviet Union can find some basis of agreement. The gulf between East and West is wider today than it was before the Cardinal Archbishop of Esztergom appeared before the People's Court in Budapest. Secretary of State Dean Acheson announced on February 10 that the United States was considering the possibility of lodging a complaint with the UN against the Hungarian court action. He termed the sentence a "conscienceless attack upon religious and personal freedom."

The Hungarian government invited Secretary Acheson's comment by using the Mindszenty trial to castigate the United States. It charged that Selden Chapin, American Minister in Budapest, encouraged the Cardinal to work for the

restoration of the Hapsburg monarchy to govern what is now the Hungarian Republic. Chapin rejected the accusation as "totally false, baseless, and outrageous," but the Hungarian government on February 12 demanded that he leave the country. The United States called him to Washington for consultation. Chapin's expulsion climaxed a progressive deterioration in Hungarian-American relations begun in 1947, when Communists preempted leadership in the Budapest government after Prime Minister Nagy had resigned during a visit to Switzerland.

Catholic vs. Communist

Religious considerations sharpened official American condemnation of the sentencing of the Cardinal to life imprisonment. On February 6 Cardinal Archbishop Spellman of New York urged the American government and people to "raise their voices as one and cry out against and work against—Satan-inspired crimes." In an allocution delivered on February 14 to the Sacred College of Cardinals in extraordinary secret consistory, Pope Pius XII declared that the principal purpose of Cardinal Mindszenty's trial was to "disrupt the Catholic Church in Hungary." From evidence so far available, it is difficult to ascertain whether Hungary, 65 per cent of whose population is Catholic, is attacking religion or endeavoring to weaken the political institution of Catholicism in a manner made familiar by other countries in the past.

Cardinal Mindszenty was adamant in opposing two domestic political policies of the Hungarian Republic—land reform and the nationalization of educa-

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tion—and he consistently refused to recognize the existence of the Republic. The two policies the Cardinal opposed were introduced under a non-Communist Prime Minister, Zoltan Tildy, a Calvinist. Mindszenty catalogued the injustices of land reform in a pastoral letter issued in 1948, although some parish priests have been known to approve the change. Last May the Cardinal hinted that he would excommunicate Catholics who supported nationalization of education. Nevertheless, Parliament enacted the nationalization law on June 19, 1948. From the Catholic point of view the government's refusal to let the Church educate the young is very damaging to the religious freedom guaranteed in the Hungarian peace treaty. The United States, however, did not protest against the nationalization law. The Cardinal rejected the government's overtures

for negotiations to permit nuns and monks to teach in the state schools. Mindszenty's attitude toward education led directly to his break with the government. The prosecution recalled his views on the subject during the trial. The government's charges, however, stressed not the Cardinal's interference with domestic reform but his alleged conspiracy to restore the Crown of St. Stephen to a Hapsburg. Thus the government's emphasis was on the issue whether political opposition is treasonable or criminal—another point on which a deep gulf exists between East and West.

Several facts, notably that Hungary last autumn jailed a Lutheran Bishop, that Bulgaria has recently indicted fifteen Protestant ministers, and that Polish priests are harassed by the government, appear to support the contention that Eastern European governments oppose re-

ligion as such. It should be noted, however, that religion is being attacked, in part at least, for its links with the West. The Lutheran influence in Hungary is primarily German. Among those indicted by Bulgaria are British and American citizens.

The principal issue in the Hungarian controversy appears to be whether the Budapest government will be able to eliminate all influences which are in any way hostile to the progress of the Hungarian revolution. The goal of the government is the creation of a national religion, or series of religions, free from ecclesiastical or cultural influences foreign to Hungary or foreign to the Soviet community of states. From the point of view of the United States, the removal of all Western religious influence would result in strengthening Eastern influence.

BLAIR BOLLES

Western Europe Takes Limited Step Toward Unity

The projected Council of Europe signalizes the continuing evolution of a framework for Western European unity which, while satisfactory to no nation, contains considerable potentiality for further growth. Under the impetus of the Marshall plan, sixteen European states already participate in the Organization for European Economic Cooperation established under the treaty of April 16, 1948. While the decisions of the OEEC, taken by general consent, are not binding on the members, consultations are now under way for the creation of an inner council which would be granted powers to coordinate national economic plans.

The most significant organs for military collaboration have been developed under the Brussels five-power pact of March 17, 1948. It is expected that the proposed North Atlantic pact would underwrite these military security arrangements.

A Parliamentary Assembly?

Less publicity has attached to the non-military work of the Brussels pact organization carried on by the Consultative Council which consists of the five Foreign Ministers meeting quarterly, the Permanent Commission in London, the Secretariat, and various other ministerial and technical committees. It was in the Consultative Council that a compromise agreement was finally reached on January 28 for the establishment of a Council of Europe. When this body meets again in April it will consider a draft constitution for the proposed new agency

which is now being prepared by the Permanent Commission, and final plans will go to a conference of European states.

The initiative taken by the French government on August 18, 1948—when, following the Hague Congress of the previous May and the ensuing "European Movement," it proposed a five-power meeting before the year's end to consider establishment of a European parliament—led to the convening of a committee on European unity in Paris on November 26.

In this body differences of opinion were focused on the question of the proposed parliamentary assembly. Considerable sentiment had developed in favor of moving rapidly toward a complete federation of Europe. This view, widely held in France, received concrete expression at the second congress of the European Parliamentary Union at Interlaken which, on September 2, 1948 adopted a charter calling for an assembly which should proceed to establish a federal Europe with sovereign power vested in a bicameral legislature. From November 6 to 11 another group, the European Union of Federalists, held its second annual conference in Rome where it, too, went on record favoring a government for Europe as a step toward final world federation.

Virtually all schools of thought saw European union as a means to: 1) solve the dollar problem; 2) increase Europe's military power and its security from Soviet expansion; 3) create a third major force to act as a balance between Russia and America; and 4) settle the German

problem by providing a framework within which German industrial capacity could be utilized for European co-operation instead of domination. But whereas France and the Federalists believe these ends could be achieved only through a definitive transfer of sovereignty to a new central authority, London argued that existing organs, if expanded, could accomplish these objectives, whereas a parliamentary assembly might fail and so weaken the whole movement for unity.

Britain's Objections

Specifically the Labor government maintained that the OEEC and the Brussels pact would produce such interlocking mutual obligations and interests that no nation could afford to withdraw from the partnership. This "functional" approach would then enable Europe, step by step, to meet specific problems without the arbitrary limitations of a constitutional apparatus. Observers also called attention to the possible conflict between Britain's imperial and commonwealth ties—especially as concerns trading preference arrangements—and prospective European obligations, and to British fears lest a European authority should disturb the intricate pattern of national planning now being developed in the United Kingdom.

Although the French agreed to Britain's proposal for the establishment of a "ministerial committee"—whose decisions, reached in secret, could cover any subject but national defense—London was unwilling to sanction a European assembly.

The compromise reached by the Consultative Council on January 28, provided for a European "consultative committee" of severely limited scope. It would have only the power to make recommendations, and its agenda would be controlled by the ministerial committee. It would hold brief annual public sessions and could appoint preparatory commissions. The national delegations would be appointed by each country as it saw fit instead of by national parliaments on a proportional representation basis. This provision, the final point of compromise, grew out of Britain's reluctance to permit the Opposition, led by Mr. Churchill, to be represented in an international assembly, and its fear that Communist participation would

jeopardize the whole enterprise.

That all Englishmen did not share this sentiment was evidenced by a *Manchester Guardian Weekly* editorial which defended the idea of a parliament on the grounds that it would 1) give new courage and inspiration to the average European, 2) counter German nationalism by producing a new European consciousness, and 3) greatly strengthen Europe's foreign policy by providing a single mouthpiece. Many Americans, also, who had hoped that under the impetus of the Marshall plan Europe would advance toward real unity, will find the new scheme disappointing.

Nevertheless, the projected Council of Europe will add an important political

channel for the settlement of European questions, including more nations than the five-power Brussels pact. On February 4 the Italian cabinet council decided to accept an invitation to participate, and on January 28 the Foreign Ministers of Sweden, Norway, Denmark and Iceland announced their interest in the project. Most important, the "consultative committee," although deprived of substantive power, will to some extent represent peoples and not governments. Thus the arrangement, while denounced by the Federalists, has been hailed by the "European Movement" as a means of arousing public opinion in Europe, and subsequently proceeding by stages in the direction of final union.

FRED W. RIGGS

Piecemeal Aid Unlikely To Revive Spain's Economy

Official Spanish circles are jubilant over the Chase National Bank loan of \$25 million to Spain's Foreign Exchange Institute, the purpose of which has not yet been announced. They are confident that the loan, announced February 8, represents only the first substantial injection of dollars into the ailing Spanish economy. The Chase credit, carrying an undisclosed rate of interest, extends for only six months and is entirely secured in gold, which the Spanish government has deposited in London for this purpose.

Welcome though it is, the Chase loan meets only a small portion of Spain's immediate dollar needs. Last November General Franco set at \$200 million the amount Spain would like to borrow from the United States to finance purchases of industrial and transport equipment. The "extremely modest" program of "extraordinary imports" drawn up by the private Urquijo Bank of Madrid, in its 1948 report, valued at \$777 million the cost of equipment from all sources needed during the four-year period, 1948-52, to rehabilitate the Spanish economy. This estimate, moreover, did not include Spanish requirements abroad for foodstuffs and raw materials used by the consumer goods industries, which would bring the total to \$1.475 million for the entire four-year period. The Urquijo Bank program was intended to be fitted into the European Recovery Program, and Franco himself no longer disclaims interest in that project.

Economic Bottlenecks

The central problem in Spain today is economic, but an economic problem which

carries grave political implications for the Franco regime. Since 1936 the economy has been living on its own fat. Spain must re-equip and modernize its transportation system and the power, mining, steel, and textile industries if it is to raise the productive capacity of the economy, increase its exports, and redress the chronically adverse balance of trade. Yet as the Generalissimo pointed out in an interview with the *New York Times* correspondent, Cyrus L. Sulzberger, on November 11, Spain is caught in a vicious circle. "Our production is limited because we have not the means to augment it. But we cannot buy those means because we cannot export sufficiently to obtain the necessary dollars."

The government only this year succeeded in partially stemming the inflation, attributable primarily to the devastation wreaked on the country by the civil war, but seriously aggravated by the heavy budgetary outlays of a police state, by speculation, and by a marked degree of corruption in high places. Nevertheless, prices have continued to rise, and the overvaluation of the peseta—which may not be alleviated by the new sliding scale of exchange values announced late last December—has placed Spanish exports at a competitive disadvantage in world markets. The Spanish foreign exchange situation, in consequence, could hardly be more serious. Imports in the first seven months of the year were down to little more than a third of the import indices based on the relatively stable years of the Primo de Rivera dictatorship. Purchases from the United States are limited to what can be financed from current sales.

Spanish agriculture and industry have made strenuous efforts to overcome the "strangling effects"—as the Urquijo Bank report described them—imposed by obsolete plant, shortages of raw materials, and government regulations. Last year, however, the economy also had to cope with the most severe and prolonged drought in thirty-one years. By September electric power production, already sadly inadequate to the potential demand, had fallen from the January peak of 516 million kilowatt hours to 295 million kilowatt hours. The important industrial areas around Barcelona and Bilbao were especially hard hit. The textile mills of Catalonia, where this vital export industry is centered, are barely able to keep open two days a week as a result of restrictions on the use of electric power which have been imposed with varying degrees of severity upon all industrial and commercial operations. The consequent increase in production costs will undoubtedly further distort Spain's price structure, bring new increases in the cost of living, and contribute to the balance-of-payments problem.

Succor to Franco?

If the vicious circle is to be broken at some point, this will manifestly have to be done through foreign aid. Such aid might come to Spain from one or several sources: private investment institutions in the United States, the Export-Import Bank, or — conditions permitting — the ERP or the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development. The gold security feature of the Chase loan indicates that private American sources do

not regard Franco as a particularly good risk. Whether help will be forthcoming beyond the piecemeal assistance which American private enterprise may be able and willing to offer depends, in the last analysis, upon a decision by the United States to reverse its policy of excluding Spain from the benefits of Western political co-operation. This is a difficult decision, in which the possible strategic and economic arguments for bolstering Franco must be weighed against the political disadvantages. As long as Spaniards have something to eat—and an Argentine wheat credit assures this for the coming year, at least—it is likely that Washington will postpone the decision.

OLIVE HOLMES

FPA Bookshelf

Peace or Power, by Harold Butler. London, Faber, 1948. \$4.50

A former director of the International Labor Organization and member of the British Embassy staff in Washington analyzes the ideological differences between East and West. He finds that the issue is between peace and power and hopes that the United Nations can achieve broad general agreement between Russia and the West. Failing that, he foresees that the UN "may become the collective expression of the Western ideal" which, "buttressed by power," will continue to stand as the only promise of peace.

A Man Called White, by Walter White. New York, Viking Press, 1948. \$3.75

In the form of a warmly human autobiography Mr. White has told the story, not only of a man who chose to be a "Negro" rather than a "white," but also of race relations in America, and of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People which he has served as general secretary since 1931.

Woodrow Wilson, a Selected Bibliography of his Published Writings, Addresses and Public Papers, by Laura Shearer Turnbull. Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1948. \$2.00

Anyone interested in the life and thinking of the war-time President will welcome this slim volume by the curator of the Woodrow Wilson Collection in the Princeton University Library. It lists 1,137 items, and a concluding chapter by Katharine E. Brand gives 111 books in the Woodrow Wilson field.

Last Chance, edited by Clara Urquhart. Boston, Beacon Press, 1948. \$2.50

In rather novel form, 26 thinkers, philosophers, and leaders of 14 different countries give their answers to 11 basic questions covering the outlook for the world today. While necessarily of uneven quality, the comments of such varied personalities as Benedetto Croce, Toyohiko Kagawa, Lin Yutang, Archibald MacLeish, Henry Miller, George Santayana, Luigi Sturzo, Trygve Lie, Bertrand Russell, Pearl Buck and Emil Brunner make interesting and frequently stimulating reading.

News in the Making

Of all the nations outside the United States that might be included in the proposed North Atlantic defense pact, *Canada* has displayed the most consistent and profound interest in the conclusion of such a pact. Plans for continental defense, reinforced by a vast radar and aircraft interceptor network were to be the principal topic of conversations Canadian Prime Minister St. Laurent began with President Truman in Washington on February 12. . . . The eleventh-hour withdrawal on February 10 of General Norton de Mattos, candidate of the anti-Salazar forces in *Portugal*, from the presidential elections of February 13 which resulted in the re-election of Marshal Carmona to the office he has held since 1928, was based on the ground that existing legislation rigged the outcome in favor of the Salazar dictatorship. The opposition, however, had shown surprising strength during the period of "sufficient liberty" decreed for campaign purposes, and is not expected to accept Prime Minister Salazar's victory without a struggle. . . . Rendering another decision on a bitter perennial issue, *the people of Northern Ireland* on February 10 voted almost 2 to 1 in favor of their continued union with Britain. Unionist candidates won 37 seats in the Belfast Parliament against 11 for the opposition. Although the partition was thus once more affirmed, Irish nationalists are unreconciled, charging that the electoral system is unfair, and agitation for union is expected to crop up again. . . . As the *Netherlands government* continued to delay a decision on the UN Security Council resolution of January 28 which called for immediate release of Republican prisoners and establishment of an interim federal government by March 15, and prepared to submit a set of counterproposals, indications of a victory for the "moderates" at The Hague were seen in the resignation of Minister of Overseas Territories, E. M. J. A. Sassen, hitherto considered the principal cabinet opponent of UN intervention in Indonesia. . . . The possibility of developing *the resources of Central Africa* has

Branch & Affiliate Meetings

*NEW YORK, February 19, *The Crisis in China—What Policy?*, Stanley K. Hornbeck, Nathaniel Peffer

*ST. PAUL, February 19, *The Work of the International Monetary Fund*, E. M. Bernstein

*BUFFALO, February 21, *Atomic Energy—Menace or Promise?*, Joseph G. Hoffman, Victor B. Corey, Clifford C. Furnas

TULSA, February 23, *Basic Trends in the Middle East*, John S. Badeau

OKLAHOMA CITY, February 24, *Basic Trends in the Middle East*, John S. Badeau

ST. LOUIS, February 25, *Basic Trends in the Middle East*, John S. Badeau

*CLEVELAND, February 28, *Czechoslovakia's New Role in Europe*, Gen. Jaroslav Hasal

BETHLEHEM, March 3, *An Appraisal of U.N. Accomplishments and Failures*, Fred W. Riggs

PHILADELPHIA, March 4, *Japan*, Lt. Gen. Robert Eichelberger

*Data taken from printed Branch announcement.

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been enhanced as a result of the discovery by British scientists of a new inexpensive drug which can immunize or cure trypanosomiasis in animals, a disease carried by the tsetse fly, heretofore a major factor in preventing Central Africa's development. This news is of particular significance for Britain, where there have been complaints recently about the difficulty of obtaining Argentine beef at a reasonable price.

FOREIGN POLICY BULLETIN. Vol. XXVIII, No. 19, FEBRUARY 18, 1949. Published weekly from September through May inclusive and biweekly during June, July and August by the Foreign Policy Association, Incorporated. National Headquarters, 22 East 38th Street, New York 16, N. Y. BROOKS EMENY, President; HELEN M. DAGGETT, Secretary; VERA MICHELES DEAN, Editor. Re-entered as second-class matter June 4, 1948, at the Post Office at New York, N. Y., under the Act of March 3, 1879. Four Dollars a Year. Please allow at least one month for change of address on membership publications.

F. P. A. Membership (which includes the Bulletin), Six Dollars a Year.

Produced under union conditions and composed and printed by union labor.